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Abstract. In this paper we investigate how to model legal abrogation and annul-
ment in Defeasible Logic. We examine some options that embed in this setting,
and similar rule-based systems, ideas from belief and base revision. In both cases,
our conclusion is negative, which suggests to adopt a different logical model.
1 Introduction
Mainly inspired by [1], most formal models of norm change usually focus on the dy-
namics of obligations and permissions. However, as rightly noted on the occasion of
a recent workshop on this topic3, “these systems did not explicitly refer to possible
changes in the underlying norms [. . . ]”. In fact, “new norms may be created and old
norms may need to be retracted. In this dynamic setting, it is essential to distinguish
norms from obligations and permissions as studied by deontic logic, to understand the
formal properties specific for the dynamics of norms, and to describe how such objects
can be manipulated [. . . ]”. Unfortunately, “a formal model that captures the relevant
features of norm change is still lacking”.
The aim of our work is to make some steps in this direction by investigating the
notion of legal modification. Legal modifications are the ways through which the law
implements norm dynamics [10]. Modifications can be either explicit or implicit. In the
first case, the law introduces norms whose peculiar objective is to change the system
by specifying what and how other existing norms should be modified. In the second
case, the legal system is revised by introducing new norms which are not specifically
meant to modify previous norms, but which change in fact the system because they are
incompatible with such existing norms. The most interesting case is when we deal with
explicit modifications, which permit to classify a large number of modification types.
In general, we have different types of modifying norms, as their effects (the resulting
modifications) may concern, for example, the text of legal provisions, their scope, or
their time of force, efficacy, or applicability [10,8,9]. Derogation is an example of scope
change: a norm n supporting a conclusion P and holding at the national level may be
derogated by a norm n′ supporting a different conclusion P′ within a regional context.
Hence, derogation corresponds to introducing one or more exceptions to n. Temporal
3 http://icr.uni.lu/normchange07/
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changes impact on the target norm in regard to its date of force (the time when the norm
is “usable”), date of effectiveness (when the norm in fact produces its legal effects)
or date of application (when conditions of norm applicability hold). An example of
change impacting on time of force is when a norm n is originally in force in 2007 but a
modification postpones n to 2008. Substitution replaces some textual components of a
provision with other components. For example, some of its applicability conditions are
replaced by other conditions.
We are interested here in studying the concepts of abrogation and annulment.
Annulment is usually seen as a kind of repeal, as it makes a norm invalid and re-
moves it from the legal system. Its peculiar effect applies ex tunc: annuled norms are
prevented to produce all their legal effects, independently of when they are obtained.
The nature of abrogation is most controversial. In some cases, it is important to
see whether the abrogation is the result of judicial review, legislation, or referenda.
But again, despite domestic peculiarities, abrogations, too, are seen as a type of norm
removal, even though they are different from annulments; the main point is usually that
abrogations operate ex nunc and so do not cancel the effects that were obtained before
the modification.
If so, it seems that abrogations cannot operate retroactively. However, this is not
always true. Even where retroactive abrogations are prohibited (such as in the Italian
system), the problem is open in some contexts. Suppose an ordinary court is called upon
to decide a case in which a norm n applies, but the court argues that n infringes some
fundamental rights and so it suspends the trial proceedings referring to the constitutional
court to decide on the illegitimacy and abrogation of n. Constitutional court’s decision
and abrogation of n is necessarily posterior to the case. Hence, what is the difference
between these modifications?
Suppose that a norm n1 in force in 2006 states that, if your annual income is less
than 5,000 euros, you are a needy person and norm n2 says that a needy person has
the right to live for free in a council house. If n is retroactively annuled in 2007, this
counts as n’s removal since 2006, and all its effects are blocked. Imagine now that
two norms n3 and n4 are added in 2007 stating that needy people’s income is less than
3,000 euros and that needy people are eligible for medical aid. Even if n is retroactively
abrogated in 2007, jurists may argue that its indirect effect (obtained via n2: right to
house) should not be estinguished in 2007, whereas the propagation of the qualification
“needy person” (with an income of less than 5,000 euros) cannot propagate from 2006
to 2007, since this would make n4 applicable. Note that, in other cases, indirect effects
should propagate whereas the direct effect should be blocked, or all past effects should
propagate, or, again, norm removal should apply after in 2007 and only blocking some
effects retroactively holds. In fact, jurists [10] say that abrogations can at most block
some, but not all, past effects (otherwise, we would have annulments).
To sum up, and independently of terminological issues, what we have to bear in
mind is that here the law implements different reasoning patterns: in one case norms
are removed with all their effects, whereas in other cases norms are removed but some
or all their effects propagate if obtained before the modification.
How to model these scenarios? Clearly, a temporal representation may help, but
the point is whether we can abstract from this aspect and move to a general analysis
(e.g., based on theory revision) where time is not considered. We address this issue
using Defeasible Logic (DL) [12,2], but analogous considerations can be extended to
other nonmonotonic (sceptical) rule-based systems. Although other options are avail-
able, rule-based systems seem a natural way to represent legal systems: legal norms are
usually viewed as rules specifying some applicability conditions and a legal effect.
In this paper we discuss whether it is possible to adjust belief and theory revision in
DL to capture abrogation and annulment. The layout is as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of DL. Section 3 considers an immediate method to adjust revision of belief
sets in DL in order to capture annulment. Section 4 examines a possible alternative in
which all operations, including contraction, are captured by only adding a suitable set
of new rules. Even though this second option is better for modelling abrogation and
annulment, some basic problems remain unsolved. Section 5 takes advantage of some
ideas from the previous section and discusses how base revision in DL can be applied
to capture norm removals. However, also this approach is not fully satisfactory, which
suggests to adopt a different conceptual model, whose general features are illustrated in
Section 6. This is the new model we have used for our initial investigation on modelling
norm changes in DL [8,9].
2 Overview of Defeasible Logic
DL is based on a logic programming-like language and it is a simple, efficient but
flexible non-monotonic formalism capable of dealing with many different intuitions
of non-monotonic reasoning. An argumentation semantics exists [7]. DL has a linear
complexity [11] and also has several efficient implementations [3]. In addition, some
preliminary works on legal modifications in DL have been recently proposed [8,9].
A defeasible theory D is a structure (F,R,) where F is a finite set of facts, R
a finite set of rules, and  an acyclic superiority relation on R. Facts are represented
as literals and are indisputable statements. A rule expresses a relationship between a
set of premises and a conclusion. We have in DL three types of rules conveying the
strength of the relationships: strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters. A strict rule
has the form A1, . . . ,An→ B and states the strongest kind of relationship since its con-
clusion always holds when the premises are indisputable. Defeasible rules have the
form A1, . . . ,An⇒ B and cover the case when the conclusion normally holds when the
premises tentatively hold; defeaters have the form A1, . . . ,An ; B and consider a sit-
uation where the premises do not warrant the conclusions: in defeaters the premises
simply prevent another rule to support the opposite.
Accordingly, a conclusion can be labelled either as definite or defeasible. A definite
conclusion is an indisputable conclusion, while a defeasible conclusion can be retracted
if additional premises become available. DL is based on a constructive proof theory for
conclusions. Hence, we can say that a derivation for a conclusion exists and that it is
not possible to give a derivation for a conclusion. Based on these two ideas conclusions
will be tagged according to their strength and type of derivation:
– +∆B, meaning that we have a definite proof for B (a definite proof is a proof where
we use only facts and strict rules);
– −∆B, meaning that it is not possible to build a definite proof for B;
– +∂B, meaning that we have a defeasible proof for B;
– −∂B, meaning that it is not possible to give a defeasible proof for B.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D = (F,R,). A
derivation is a finite sequence P = (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) of tagged literals satisfying four
conditions (which correspond to inference rules for each of the four kinds of conclu-
sion). P(1..i) denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length i.
Proof conditions for strict derivations are here omitted. Strict proofs are just deriva-
tions based on detachment for strict rules. Given a strict rule A1, . . . ,An→ B, where we
have definite proofs for all Ai’s, we can deduce B (+∆B).
DL is a sceptical non-monotonic formalism: with a possible conflict between two
conclusions (i.e., one is the negation of the other), DL refrains to take a decision and
we deem both as not provable unless we have some more pieces of information that can
be used to solve the conflict. One way to solve conflicts is to use a superiority relation
over rules. The superiority relation gives us a preference over rules with conflicting
conclusions. In case we have a conflict between two rules we prefer the conclusion of
the strongest of the two rules. The superiority relation is applied in defeasible proofs.
Some notational conventions before presenting proof conditions for defeasible
derivations. Each rule is identified by a unique label. A(r) denotes the set of antecedents
of a rule r, while C(r) denotes its consequent. If R is a set of rules, Rs is the set of all
strict rules in R, Rsd the set in R of strict and defeasible rules, Rd the set of defeasible
rules, and Rd f t the set of defeaters. R[B] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent
B. If B is a literal,∼B denotes the complementary literal (if B is a positive literal C then
∼B is ¬C; and if B is ¬C, then ∼B is C).
Defeasible proofs proceed in three phases: we first look for an argument supporting
the conclusion we want to prove (an applicable rule for the conclusion). Second, we
look for arguments for the opposite of what we want to prove. Third, we rebut the coun-
terarguments. This can be done by showing that the counterargument is not founded
(i.e., some of the premises do not hold), or by defeating the counterargument, i.e., the
counterargument is weaker than an argument for the conclusion we want to prove. For-
mally,
+∂ : If P(i+1) = +∂B then either
(1) +∆B ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [B]∀A ∈ A(r) : +∂A ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼B ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼B] either
(2.3.1) ∃A ∈ A(s) :−∂A ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [B] such that
∀A ∈ A(t) : +∂A ∈ P(1..i) and t  s.
−∂ : If P(i+1) =−∂B then
(1) −∆B ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd [B] ∃A ∈ A(r) :−∂A ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.2) +∆∼B ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼B] such that
(2.3.1) ∀A ∈ A(s) : +∂A ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd [B] either
∃A ∈ A(t) :−∂A ∈ P(1..i) or t 6 s.
3 Revising Extensions of Normative Systems
In the remainder of this paper we address the problem of how to embed in DL some
ideas from belief and base revision in order to capture annulment and abrogation. We
attack two different problems raised by these modifications: (i) how to block either
some or all norm effects; (ii) how to model norm removals in legal systems. As we
argued, even though such modifications have a temporal flavour, we move to a general
analysis where time is not considered.
We assume that a defasible theory can represent the basic logical structure of a legal
system [8,9]. It is a general tenet in the literature that one reason why legal reasoning
is defeasible depends on the fact that, in may cases, norm conclusions can be obtained
only if we do not have stronger norms attacking them [14]. DL theories consist of a
set of rules (which may be defeasible), a set of facts, and a set of priorities over rules
(which establish their relative strength). In this perspective, rules naturally correspond
to legal norms, while priorities represent the criteria used to solve legal conflicts. Hence,
a general picture like this provides a standard for capturing the basics of legal systems
[13]. With this said, let us begin with our discussion on annulment and abrogation.
Approaches based on AGM usually assume that a belief set B is a theory, i.e., a
set of formulas closed under a logical consequence relation, thus B = Cn(B). Let us
consider the equivalent of this notion in DL.
Let HBT be the Herbrand Base for a Defeasible Theory T . In [2], the extension of a
Defeasible Theory T is defined as the 4-tuple
E(T ) = (∆+(T ),∆−(T ),∂+(T ),∂−(T )),
where #±(T ) = {p|p ∈ HBT ,T ` ±#p}, # ∈ {∆ ,∂}.
Definition 1. Let T = (F,R,) be a Defeasible Theory. We define another Defeasible
Theory T ′ = ( /0,R′, /0) such that R′ is the smallest set satisfying the following conditions
– if p ∈ ∆+(T ), then→ p ∈ R′;
– if p ∈ ∂+(T ), then⇒ p ∈ R′;
– if p /∈ ∆+(T )∪∆−(T ), then
p→ p ∈ R′s;
– if p ∈ ∆−(T ), then R′s[p] = /0;
– if p ∈ ∂−(T ), then R′d [p] = /0;
– if p /∈ ∂+(T )∪∂−(T ), then
p⇒ p ∈ R′.
We will say that T ′ is the theory generated by the extension of T .
Proposition 1. Let T be a defeasible theory. For every p∈HBT , T ` #± p iff T ′ ` #± p.
The above result gives us an immediate way to define contraction for revision based on
belief sets. We define T	c = T ′ such that E(T ) = (∆+(T ),∆−(T ),∂+(T ),∂−(T )) and
T ′ is the theory generated by the extension
(∆+(T )−{c},∆−(T ),∂+(T )−{c},∂−(T )).
It is easy to verify that the above way to define contraction satisfies all AGM postulates.
The meaning of the result in Proposition 1 is that for every theory (and so every set of
conclusions), we can generate a new equivalent theory without looking at the structure
of the original theory: In fact, classically two theories are equivalent if they have the
same extension (the same set of conclusions).
How can the procedure described in Definition 1 be used to cover abrogation and
annulment?
Let examine annulment. When we annul a norm in a legal system, this means that
all (direct and indirect) legal effects deriving from it must be cancelled as well. For
example, if we have a normative system T containing only the rules A⇒ B and B⇒C,
then the annulment of the former rule (assuming the fact A) should block both B and C.
Intuition suggests that contraction is the right operation to capture annulment. Hence,
the question is how to use contraction in this case. What one could do here is simply
to remove the consequent of the rule. However, the (positive defeasible) extension of
T (i.e., ∂+(T )) is {A,B,C},4 and contracting B leaves C in the extension. Hence, this
immediate use of contraction is not representative of legal annulment. As we said, we
have to consider all consequences of the formula to be contracted. In the above example,
C can only be derived if B does. Accordingly, annulment of any rule A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B
could be defined as follows. Let T = (F,R,) be a Defeasible Theory. Then
T	A1,...,An⇒B =
{
T if A1, . . . ,An⇒ B 6∈ R or {A1, . . .An} 6⊆ ∂+
(F ′,R′,′) otherwise
such that
(F ′,R′,′) is the theory generated by E(T )−E(T ′)
and T ′ =(F = {B},R,).
(1)
The contraction operation reflecting annulment is defined by “removing” the conse-
quent of the rule. In addition, the theory T ′ generates all consequences of B with respect
to T . Then T	A⇒B is the theory generated by the extension E(T )−E(T ′). However, let
us consider another example.
Example 1. Assume to work with the following theory:
T = (F = {A},R = {A⇒ B, B⇒C, A⇒C}, /0).
Thus,
T ′ = (F = {B},R = {A⇒ B, B⇒C, A⇒C}, /0).
Hence, (∂+(T ) = {A,B,C})− (∂+(T ′) = {B,C}) = {A}, and this leads (by applying
Definition 1) to obtain that T	A⇒B corresponds to
T ′′ = ( /0,R = {⇒ A}, /0).
This procedure is not satisfactory unless more sophisticated measures are added. Ex-
ample 1 shows that the procedure does not properly work, as C has multiple causes (B
and A): with T ′′ we exclude A⇒ B by dropping B (and its consequences), but this leads
to drop, too, C and so to exclude A⇒C, which is too much.
In addition, the above procedure requires to change the set of facts, which seems to
us meaningless. Why cannot we change the set of facts? The facts of a theory are only
those pieces of evidence in a case used to apply rules (norms) and not to change them:
hence they should not be considered when one modifies norms. Accordingly, if norms
are represented as rules, then reasoning only on the consequences of a theory is not rep-
resentative of norm change. For example, the norm HighIncome⇒ TopMarginalRate
4 From now on, whenever clear from the context, we will use the term ‘extension of a theory’ as
either the positive defeasible extension of it or the full extension of the theory (see Definition
1).
says that if the income of a person is in excess of the threshold for high income, then
the top marginal rate must be applied. If it is a fact that Nino exceeded the threshold
(i.e., HighIncome ∈ F) then he has to pay the top marginal rate. Thus the extension
is {HighIncome,TopMarginalRate}; contracting with HighIncome results in the theory
just consisting in ⇒ TopMarginalRate, namely in a rule stating that, no matter what
your income is, you will have to pay taxes at the top marginal rate. Thus, revising the
evidence on which a case is based results in a change in the legislation, which seems a
non-sense when applied to real legal systems.
The idea behind Definition 1 and (1) is that we have to generate a new normative
system from the revised extension of corresponding source normative system. However,
there are at least three reasons why Definition 1 and (1) do not seem satisfactory:
1. they may change the set of facts, and so do not differentiate between norms and
instances of cases;
2. they revise theories regardless of the logical structure of the source theories;
3. they do not correctly account for ex tunc modifications, such as annulment.
Changing facts or generating new theories whose structure does not reflect the theories
from which they have been obtained trivialise the concept of legal change. Indeed, it
is crucial in the law to establish what rules generate which effects. Therefore, the con-
traction function defined in this section does not offer a suitable method for modelling
annulment (and, in general, norm changes), even if it satisfies all AGM postulates.
4 Revising Normative Systems by Adding Exceptions
The difficulties under points 1 and 2 above can be alleviated by adopting in DL the
approach proposed in [4] to deal with belief revision of rule-based non-monotonic for-
malisms, where change operators are not applied to the set of facts and are all im-
plemented by adding new rules and changing priorities. This permits to incrementally
modify the legal system, taking into account the logical structure of the source theory.
Let us briefly recall the basic features of this approach.
Let us examine expansion. Following [6], expansion adds a formula A to ∂+(T )
only if ¬A 6∈ ∂+(T ). Hence, the case where ¬A ∈ ∂+(T ) is irrelevant. However AGM
decided to also add A in this case. In [4] T is kept unchanged, following [6] rather than
[1]. Let c = P1, . . .Pn be the formulas to be added. Expansion can be defined as follows:
T+c =
{
T if ∼Pi ∈ ∂+(T ) or ∼Pi = Pj for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
(F,R′,′) otherwise
where
R′ =R∪{⇒ P1, . . . ,⇒ Pn}
′ =( ∪ {⇒ Pi  r | i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},r ∈ R[∼Pi]})−
{r ⇒ Pi | i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},r ∈ R[∼Pi]}.
(2)
Thus, rules are added that prove each of the literals Pi, and it is ensured that these are
strictly stronger than any possibly contradicting rules.
Let us examine contraction, which seems the right candidate to capture at least some
aspects of abrogation and annulment5:
T−c =
{
T if P1, . . . ,Pn 6∈ E(T )
(F,R′,′) otherwise
where
R′ =R∪{P1, . . . ,Pi−1,Pi+1, . . . ,Pn; ∼Pi | i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}}
′ = − {s r | r ∈ R′−R}.
(3)
Intuitively, (3) aims to prevent the proof of all the Pis. To achieve this it is ensured that
at least one of the Pis will not be proven. The new rules in R′ ensure that if all but one
Pi have been proven, a defeater with head ∼Pj will fire. Having made the defeaters not
weaker than any other rules, the defeater cannot be “counterattacked” by another rule,
and Pj will not be proven, as an inspection of the condition +∂ in Section 2 shows.
This approach slightly deviates from the AGM postulates, in particular from those
for contraction. The second AGM postulate states that we contract a formula only by
deleting some formulas, but not by adding new ones. This postulate cannot be adopted
here because it contradicts the sceptical nonmonotonic nature of DL. To see this, sup-
pose that we know A, and we have rules⇒ B and A⇒¬B. Then A is sceptically prov-
able and B is not. But if we decide to contract A, B becomes sceptically provable. Note
that this behaviour is not confined to DL but holds in any sceptical nonmonotonic for-
malism [4]. Another peculiarity of this approach is the clear distinction between facts
and rules and that facts are indisputable and cannot be changed. Thus, the negation of
facts correspond to contradictions, and contracted facts are still included in the exten-
sion of the theory.
The advantages of [4]’s proposal are clear, as legal systems are changed by only
adding new rules. In this sense, even though it works on theory extensions (suitable
new rules ensure that some literals are included in extensions, or are excluded from
them), this approach seems closer to base revision (see Section 5). But, independently
of this question, one problem is still open: how to adjust this approach to account for
legal modifications? A legal system T is modified by selecting, as a target, one or more
norms of T , whereas [4]’s proposal parametrises operations to sets of literals. Let us
bear in mind these points and proceed with our discussion.
5 Revising Normative Bases
The main problem with revision based on belief sets is that this approach does not mimic
how the law implements norm changes, since “new” rules are generated to reflect the
changes. Legal effects of rules can be used to guide how norms should be changed, but
they should not determine what and how rules are changed. Therefore the alternative
to revision based on belief sets is base revision. As is well-known, base revision does
not operate on the extension of a theory, but rather applies to the theory “generators”
(i.e., the non-logical axioms of the theory). This idea can be naturally coupled with
5 For space reasons, [4]’s treatment of revision is omitted.
partitioning the elements of a theory into “facts” and “rules”, where the former cannot
be revised (unless update is used), while the latter may be subject to revision.
Usually, belief revision operations are defined as contraction followed by expansion
(according to Levi’s Identity). Therefore, revision often results in some rules to be re-
moved from the base of a theory. Base revision allows us to adopt different strategies,
namely, to modify rules. In the law there are different types of norm changes: some
directly correspond to the removal of rules (e.g., abrogation and annulment), while oth-
ers amount to introducing new rules (e.g., derogation), and finally some are the result
of partial modifications of provisions. In this perspective, assuming a rule-based rep-
resentation of norms, revision on bases using modification techniques seems closer to
the legal practice in so far as it allows for the conceptual distinction of these types of
changes. In addition, as argued e.g. in [5], base revision results in theories that are closer
to the structure of the theory to be revised.
Let us consider an example to introduce the idea of modification of bases. Suppose
we want to revise a theory with a rule r1 : A⇒ B and contract B when C is the case (let
us say that C implies ¬B). The revision of the rule is r′1 : A,¬C⇒ B. This means that we
have modified the original rule taking into account the exception provided by C. DL has
an elegant mechanism to deal with exceptions. An exception is simply implemented by
a rule capturing the connection between the exceptional antecedent and the conclusion
to be blocked. Thus, in the example above, instead of changing r1 into r′1, we may
simply add a new rule such as r2 : C⇒¬B or r2 : C; ¬B, and state that r2  r1. As we
have seen in Section 4, this idea has been originally proposed for DL in [4], but there
was still the open problem of how to set change operations in such a way to parametrise
them with respect to the proper target of legal modifications, namely, legal rules.
Let us see how to adjust [4]’s definitions for norm changes, and in particular for
annulment and abrogation. Let T be a theory and A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B be the rule to be
removed. For annulment:
T annul1A1,...,An⇒B = T
−
B (4)
Hence, the annulment of a rule is the contraction of the head of the rule. This solution
directly applies (3) to the head of the rule to be annulled. However, (4) is too strong
since it forces the removal of B from the extension (unless B is a fact). If we have two
different (and independent) rules applicable at the same time and with the same head,
and we just annul one of them, the other should still be able to produce its effect. But (4)
affects the second rule as well. Thus, we have to give an alternative annulment operation
based on a variant of the contraction operation.
T annul2r:A1,...,An⇒B =
{
T if B /∈ ∂+(T )
(F,R′,′) otherwise
where
R′ =R∪{r′ : ;∼B}
′= ∪{(r′,r)}∪{(s,r′)|s ∈ R[B]−{r}}
(5)
Consider the following examples.
Example 2. Let us consider the following theory:
T = (F = {A},R = {r1 : A⇒ B, r2 : B⇒C}, /0).
Clearly, ∂+(T ) = {B,C}. Hence,
T ′annul2r1:A⇒B = (F,R∪{r′1 :; ¬B}, /0).
In the resulting theory we prove−∂B, which makes r2 inapplicable, thus preventing the
positive conclusion of C.
Example 3. Let us consider again the theory in Example 1:
T = (F = {A},R = {r1 : A⇒ B, r2 : B⇒C, r3 : A⇒C}, /0).
The annulment of r1 still amounts to adding r′1 :; ¬B to R, which prevents the conclu-
sion of all literals depending only on B. Accordingly, C will be in the extension, as it is
obtained through r3. In addition, if r4 : ⇒ B were in R, r4 would be stronger than r−,
thus obtaining B.
In general this approach is closer to the legal practice, as it precisely focuses on mod-
ifications of norms and not on the modification of the normative positions (effects) of
norms. First, it does not depend on facts. Second, it offers a seamless solution to ex
tunc modifications. However, things can be viewed from a different perspective. Even
though this approach can simulate ex tunc modification like annulment (since it allow
us to block norm effects), the actual operation fails to remove norms. (Hence, this ap-
proach is appealing for modifications corresponding essentially to exceptions, such as
derogations: see Section 1.) When a norm is annulled, it is “removed” from the legal
system, whereas here we just remove the effects of the norm and its consequences.
Accordingly, we can simply remove the rule to be annulled from the set of rules:
T annul3r = (F,R−{r},) (6)
But, then, we have another problem: How to deal with ex nunc modifications, such
as abrogations? In this case, the modification of a rule should not necessarily prevent
the derivation of its conclusions. Let us consider Example 2 and assume that the ab-
rogation of r1 does not prevent the derivation of B and C. This means that, if B and
C were derivable before the modification, then they should remain in the extension of
the revised theory. Here, we have two options. First, we can argue, as done above with
annulment, that when a norm is abrogated, it is “removed” from the legal system. But,
if r1 is removed following a similar procedure to that stated in (6), the extension of the
revised theory will not contain B as well as C, whereas abrogations can also admit cases
where both conclusions should be maintained. Thus, a second option does not remove
the rule, but adds a suitable set of new rules which allow to derive what should not be
blocked. However, what can we do in this case if both B and C should not be dropped?
It seems hard to adjust (5) in order to maintain both B and C. At most, what we can do
is preventing the derivation of B and maintaining C. Only in this case, if T = (F,R,)
is a defeasible theory, then the abrogation of a norm r : A1, . . . ,An⇒ B runs as follows:
T abrr:A1,...,An⇒B =
{
T if r /∈ R
(F,R′,′) otherwise
where
R′ = R∪{r− : ; ¬B, r′ : ⇒ B′}
∪{t ′ : (A(t)−{B})∪{B′}→C(t)|t ∈ Rs and B ∈ A(t)}
∪{t ′ : (A(t)−{B})∪{B′}⇒C(t)|t ∈ Rd and B ∈ A(t)}
∪{t ′ : (A(t)−{B})∪{B′};C(t)|t ∈ Rd f t and B ∈ A(t)}
′=∪{(w,r−)|w ∈ R[B]−{r}}∪{(t ′,s)|(t,s) ∈}∪{(s, t ′)|(s, t) ∈}
(7)
where B′ is a new literal not appearing in T .
Proposition 2. Given a theory T and a rule r : A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B, for every C ∈ HBT −
{B}, T `C iff T abrr `C.
Example 4. Consider the following theory:
T = (F = {A,D},R = {r : A⇒ B, t : B⇒C, s : D⇒¬C, w : E⇒ B},(t,s) ∈)
Hence, according to (7), T abrr:A1,...,An⇒B is as follows:
T abrr:A1,...,An⇒B = (F = {A,D}
R = {r : A⇒ B, t : B⇒C, s : D⇒¬C, w : E⇒ B
r− :; ¬B, r′ :⇒ B′, t ′ : B′⇒C}
= {(t,s),(t ′,s),(w,r−)})
The fact A makes r applicable, but the introduction of r− blocks the derivation of B
using r. However, C is derived via r′ and t ′ (which is stronger than s). Note that (7) is
such that the defeater r− attacks only r (we are abrogating rule r only): hence, if E were
in F , B would be obtained from w.
In sum, we have the following possibilities:
– We omit to model annulments and abrogations as corresponding to rule removals.
Hence, we represent them working only on rule conclusions and so adopt (5) and
(7). However, (7) is partially satisfactory, as it blocks the derivation of the head of
the abrogated rule; but an abrogation may remove only norms and not the already
obtained effects of the norms to be abrogated.
– We address the issue that annulments and abrogations correspond to rule removals.
Thus, (6) works for annulments, but it seems quite hard to find an adequate coun-
terpart for abrogation.
– We do not care whether annulments and abrogations correspond to rule removals
and are free to adopt, together with (7), either (5) or (6). But, as we said, (7) is
problematic.
Of course, we do not exclude that the above problems can be settled. For exam-
ple, some limits of (7) can avoided by combining the introduction of exceptions and
the removal of the abrogated rule. This can be done by applying the idea in (6) and
subsequently reinstate the conclusions that should not be blocked. This can be done by
simply using expansion + as defined in (2). More precisely, suppose c =C1, . . .Cn are
the consequences of the rule to be abrogated which we want to maintain.
Definition 2. Let T =(F,R,) be a Defeasible Theory such that r : A1, . . . ,An⇒B∈R.
Then
T abr
′
r:A1,...,An⇒B = (T
′)+c
such that T ′ = (F,R−{r},) and c =C1, . . .Cn ∈ E(T ′′), where
– T ′′ = (F = {B},R,);
– for every Ck, 1≤ k ≤ n, Ck 6∈ E(T ′).
But, even in that case, another difficulty arises when we have to deal with retroac-
tive modifications: as we already mentioned, retroactivity is a typical feature of legal
modifications. This problem is discussed in the following section.
6 A Temporal Model for Legal Systems and Norm Change
6.1 Revision and Retroactivity
A norm modification is an operation such that a normative system (consisting of norms
and the consequences of cases) is transformed into a different normative system. Ac-
cordingly, dynamics of a normative system are described by a sequence of operations.
Suppose we have a system, let us call it T0, in which we introduce a new rule r and
subsequently we remove another rule, let us say s. The system obtained from the first
operation is T1, while the final system is T2. Thus T2 = ((T0)+r )
−
s . So far so good. But
let us suppose that that the removal of s is retroactive. How can we model this case?
The idea is that every time we have a retroactive modification we should reconstruct
the normative system at the time when the retroactive modification is effective. For
example, if the modification is effective since yesterday, we have to recover the system
as it was yesterday by undoing the operations leading to the normative system we have
today, then we have to apply the retroactive modification and finally redo the other
modifications. So, if in the example above s is a retroactive modification effective from
T0, the sequence of modifications still adds r and removes s, but the sequence of theories
is T ′1 = (T0)
−
s and T2 = ((T0)
−
s )
+
r . Is this procedure in agreement with the intuition
behind retroactive legal modifications? Our answer is negative. The point is that it is
possible to define transformations moving from one normative system Ti to Ti+1 where
the transformation is effective at Ti itself, thus the system to be changed is not the target
of the modification but the source of it. Let us consider the following example. The
normative system T0 is just the fact A. T1 is obtained from T0 by retroactively adding two
rules A⇒ B and B⇒C and these rules are effective in T0. Then the next transformation,
leading to T2 is the removal of A⇒ B from T0. But then we have two different versions
of T0. Analogous considerations apply when we work on rule consequences and model
modifications adding defeaters.
The reason why we have multiple versions of a normative system is that norms have
different temporal dimensions: the time of validity of a norm (when the norm enters
in the normative system) and the time of effectiveness (when the norm can produce
legal effects). Thus, if one wants to model norm modifications, then normative systems
must be modelled by more complicated structures. In particular, a normative system is
not just the set of norms valid in it, but it should also consider the normative systems
where the norms are effective. Accordingly, a normative system is a structure Ni =
(Ti,〈T0,T1, . . .〉), where Ti is the theory modelling the set of norms/rules and facts valid
in the normative system Ni, and 〈T0,T1, . . .〉 is the sequence of theories encoding the
effective norms for all “versions” of the normative system.
A revision of a legal system is an operation that transforms a normative system
into another normative systems by ‘changing’ the rules in it. In particular, the operation
should specify what rules are to be changed and when they are changed, and when the
changes are effective. Thus a norm change can be seen as a transaction from a normative
system Ni = (Ti,〈T i0 ,T i1 , . . .〉) to a normative system Ni+1 = (Ti+1,〈T i+10 ,T i+11 , . . .〉),
where there exists some j such that T i+1j = change(T
i
j ) for some change operation.
For example, the abrogation of a rule r may be modeled as T i+1i+1 = (T
i
i )
abr
r , and the
retroactive annulment of r, as T i+1j = (T
i
j )
annul
r for j < i. In addition, in general, once
a norm has been introduced in a normative system the norm continues to be in the
normative system unless it is explicitly removed. This means that the norm must be
included in all theories succeeding the theory in which it has been first introduced.
Accordingly, it could be very cumbersome to keep track of the changes and where
the changes have to been applied. In real normative systems norms are introduced at
a particular time, they are effective at a particular time, and so are changes –changes
are norms themselves. Thus, to obviate the issue of keeping track of the changes, and
at the same time to offer a conceptual model of norm changes, we have proposed in
[8,9] an extension of DL with time, where we consider the two temporal dimensions of
relevance for norm change (effectiveness and validity). This is done by labelling rules
with two time values, one for the validity time of the norms, and the other for their
effectiveness time; furthermore the labels indicate whether these ‘changes’ persist or
not. The idea that changes are norms themselves is captured by the notion of meta-
rule, i.e., a rule whose elements can be rules themselves and not only literals. The next
section offers the conceptual background of the proposal presented in [8,9].
6.2 Inner and Outer Time of Legal Systems
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Fig. 1. Legal System at t ′ and t ′′
The above discussion suggests that the dynamics
of a legal system LS are more correctly captured
by a time-series LS(t1),LS(t2), . . . ,LS(t j) of its
versions. Each version of LS is called a norm
repository [8,9]. The passage from one reposi-
tory to another is effected by legal modifications
or simply by persistence [9]. But dynamics of
norm change and retroactivity need to introduce
another time-line within each version of LS (see
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Figure 1). Clearly, retroactivity does not imply that we can really change the past, but
it rather requires that we have to reason on the legal system from the viewpoint of its
current version as it were revised in the past: when we change some LS(i) retroactively,
this does not mean that we modify some LS(k), k < i, but that we move back from the
perspective of LS(i). Hence, we can “travel” to the past along this inner time-line, i.e.
from the viewpoint of the current version of LS where we modify norms.
Elements contained in, or derived from, theories can propagate across these time-
lines. Hence, propagation concerns the derived conclusions of rules (when some con-
sequent P holds), the rules themselves, and also derivations (i.e., queries: +∂P). This
introduces several options regarding how modifications affect a legal system over time:
– conclusions may persist within a certain repository or across different repositories;
– derivations may persist within a certain repository or across different repositories;
– rules may persist within a certain repository or across different repositories.
For example, Figure 2(a) shows how rule persistence works. A persistent rule r enacted
at time t ′ and in force at t ′′′ carries over from the legal system LS(t ′) to the legal system
LS(t ′′), where it is still in force at t ′′′. Figure 2(b) illustrates conclusion persistence:
a conclusion A persists from LS(t ′) to LS(t ′′) even if the rules used to derive it are
no longer effective in LS(t ′′). Figure 2(c) presents a case of abrogation: in LS(t ′) rule
r, in force from tv onwards, produces a persistent effect A. The effect carries over by
persistence to LS(t ′′) even if the rule r is abrogated at tm and is no longer in force to
produce the effect. Finally, Figure 2(d) illustrates a case of annulment: in LS(t ′) rule r,
in force since tv, is applied and produces a persistent effect A. Since the rule is annulled
in LS(t ′′) at tm, the effect of A must be undone as well. While the intuition in Figures
2(c) and 2(d) seems clear, its precise implementation in DL is not simple and only a
partial solution was offered in [9]. The development of a complete DL temporal model
for abrogation and annulment is a matter of future work.
7 Summary
In this paper we investigated how to model in DL legal abrogation and annulment. Ter-
minology may vary from one legal system to another, but, despite this, it is possible
to identify in general two different reasoning patterns: in one case norms are removed
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(c) Abrogation
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(d) Annulment
with all their effects, whereas in other cases norms are removed but all or some of their
effects propagate if obtained before the modification. We examined some ways to cap-
ture these intuitions in DL using techniques from revision based on belief sets and from
base revision. We concluded that abrogation and annulment can only be partially rep-
resented in these settings. In addition, we argued that it is hard, if not impossible, to
simulate retroactivity, which clearly refers to the temporal dimension. Hence, we illus-
trated a different conceptual starting point from which the problem can be addressed.
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